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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CARL A. P ALOl\IBI,
~
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

(

D & C BUILDERS,

11284

)

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Respondent accepts Appellant's statement.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On October 24, 1966, plaintiff filed a complaint
in the District Court of 'Veber County against defendant for damages to plaintiff's residence resulting from
ddendant's installation of aluminum siding to the exterior walls of said residence in an unworkmanlike,
1

unskillful and careless manner. The complaint also
alleged that defendant's installation of said siding was
stopped by order of Ogden City because defendant
had willfully failed to obtain an Ogden City building
permit. The final allegation of the complaint was an
assertion that defendant had wrongfully caused a lien
to be filed against the residence of plaintiff, thereby
slandering plaintiff's title to his residence. The recovery
sought was $1,000.00 in actual damages and $5,000.00
as exemplary damages.
An answer, counterclaim and third-party complaint,
inter-pleading plaintiff's wife, VIOLA PALOMBI,
were duly entered by defendant. The counterclaim
sought recovery of the contract price, attorney fees
and a foreclosure of defendant's purported lien. The
four allegations of the counterclaim were ( 1) that there
was a written contract between plaintiff and defendant,
(2) that defendant had made full performance of said
contract, ( 3) that none of the contract price had been
paid by plaintiff, and (4) that defendant's lien had
been filed "within eighty days of the furnishing of the
last work or material." Written interrogatories were
propounded by plaintiff and answered by defendant.
The Honorable PARLEY E. NORSETH tried the
case without a jury and entered judgment in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of
$627.00 as general damages, $1,000.00 as exemplary
damages, $250.00 as attorneys' fee and $42.00 as reim·
bursement for the costs of plaintiff.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the trial court
decision.
STATEl\IENT OF :FACTS
On or about April 23, 1966, two sales representatives of the Appellant called upon Respondent at his
residence for the purpose of selling aluminum siding.
Their solicitation or inducement for a contract included
representations that Respondent's residence would be
"a show house" to be shown on television, that a discount was possible and that the workmanship would be
"A No. l." (Tr. p. 4, lines 14-29 and p. 34, lines 11-14)
A printed form contract, prepared by Appellant (Plaintiff's Exhibit A), was subsequently signed by Respondent and his wife.
Appellant's workmen commenced the application
of the aluminum siding to Respondent's residence on
April 26, 1966. (Tr. p. 14, lines 7-9 and p. 34, lines
25-28)

Respondent was very dissatisfied with the poor
quality of Appellant's work and telephoned to Appellant's Salt Lake Office on April 25, May 2, and May
.1, 1966, to communicate to Appellant his dissatisfaction
with the workmanship. (Tr. p. 6, lines 8-26; p. 143,
linPs 3-16; Plaintiff's Exhibit 0) Failing to get any
response from Appellant, Respondent called the Ogden
City Building Inspector, who issued a "Stop 'Vork"
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order against Appellant on May 6, 1966, for Appellant'
failure to obtain an Ogden City building permit. (Tr
p. 7, lines 14-22 and Plaintiff's Exhibit B) On May i
1966, Respondent ordered Appellant's workmen of
his premises and they complied by removing all of theli
materials, including firring strips and siding. (Tr. p
105, lines 1-14; p. 7, lines 5-9; p. 22, lines 1-26; am
6. 23, lines 4-21) No additional work was done at Re
spondent' s residence by Appellant's workmen, nor wen
any additional materials delivered to said residenc1
after Saturday, May 7, 1966; (Tr. p. 35, lines 1-17.
p. 145, lines 3-30; p. 146, lines 1-7; and p. 152, line
1-25) although Appellant requested permission o:
Respondent to finish the job on two or three occasiorn
(Tr. p. 18, lines 18-30; p. 21, lines 15-30; and p. 13j
lines 16-24)

J. F. FERRIN, an aluminum siding contractor
and RAY L. HANSEN, the Utah State Buildin1
Inspector and formerly an aluminum siding contractor
testified to the substandard and poor workmanshir
inherent in Appellant's application of siding to Re
spondent's residence. (Tr. p. 43, lines 14-30; p. 44, line
1-8; p. 48, lines 23-28; and p. 55-58) In the sarni
testimony MR. HAN SEN alluded to the unnecessar1
damage caused to Respondent's residence by Appellant\
use of improper materials. CARLISLE BAWDE~
an employee of Appellant, testified to part of the darn
age caused by Appellant's workmen. (Tr. p. 127, lint·
8-16) The general damages were described most clear!;
by Respondent during his cross examination by Appel
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]ant's counsel. (Tr. p. 18, lines 2~-30; and p. 19, lines
1-11)

Appellant's office manager, DA\' ID A. NABOR,
testified that he didn't obtain a building permit until
May 24, 1966. (Tr. p. 132, lines 16-22) It should be
noted that this building permit was not obtained until
nearly one month after the actual work had commenced.
MR. NABOR's testimony and his answers to the
interrogatories propounded by Respondent confiicted
with the testimony
and .l\IRS. PAL. of llesnon<lent
...
OMBI; however, J\,1R. NABOR did admit that his
testimony was untrue in at least one instance. (Tr.
p. 146, lines 1-25).
On August 10, 1966, Appellant caused a mechanic's
lien to be filed against Respondent's residence. The
filing date of said lien was ninety-six days after Appellant had furnished the last work and materials (:May
6, 1966) and ninety-five days after Respondent had
ordered Appellant's workmen off the premises (l\1ay
7, 196). (Tr. p. 105, lines 1-14; and p. 146, lines 5-7)
It was averred in said lien that Appellant had done
its last work on May 24, 1966, although the workman
of Appellant testified that May 6, 1966, was the last
clay any work was performed. (Tr. p. 148, 3-13; and
p. 14, lines 1-8)
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POINT I

p

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR I! ti
FINDING THE LIEN OF THE DEFENDAN'J P
AND APPELLANT TO BE INVALID.

The Respondent submits that a mechanic's lie 18
recorded 95 days after the last work and material 11
were furnished and also 95 days after the workmen hai P
been ordered away from the premises by the owne I
is invalid under Section 38-1-7, Utah Code Annotate~ )
1953.
p
Although the contract in the instant case was nu
completed by Appellant prior to the lien filed on Augrn
10, 1966, it was definitely rejected and abandoned b~
Respondent at least 95 days prior to said filing. Ir
fact Appellant's workman, CARLISLE BAWDEN
testified that Respondent had ordered Appellant'!
workmen off the premises on May 7, 1966, with th
following language:

1•

C1

2

n
e
c
l

~

c

You fellows get off here right now. I don· r
want any more work done. If you don't get oft
I will call the law on you. (Tr. p. 105, lines 7-9 v
t

This absolute rejection of the contract and its perform (
ance by Appellant was reaffirmed at least once b:
Respondent prior to May 24, 1966, when he refuser,
to permit MR. LYLE JENSEN, one of Appellant'- c
workmen, to resume work. (Tr. p. 136, lines 1-15
and p. 155, lines 3-28) These assertions and acts 01
Respondent were the testimony of Appellant's owr \
witnesses and render untenable the statement in Ap
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pdlant's Brief, page 5, that May 24, 1966, was the first
I! tirne Appellant learned of Respondent's refusal "Lo
lN'i permit the work to go on."
It is generally held that abandonment of a contract
lie is equivalent to completion for purposes of filing a
rial mechanic's lien, or construed as a constructive comhai plction. Annot., 64 A.L.R. 276, 277 ( 1930) ; Stark-

,vne Davis Co. v. ·Fellows, 129 Or. 281, 277 P. 110, 64

A.L.R. 271 (1929). l\iany cases have supported the
principle that niere cessation of labor will not of itself
constitute an abandonment. See 64 A.L.R. 276, at
nu 286, f n. 29.
grn
l b~
These cases establishing the doctrine of abandon. Ir ment as the equivalent of constructive completion
E~' enumerate the following elements of the doctrine: ( 1)
mt'! cessation of work, ( 2) intention to abandon the conthi lract, and ( 3) fair notice to potential lien claimants.
Not only are all of these elements present in the instant
case, but one additional element is present-an absolute
lon'
oft rejeetion of the contract by the owner which rejection
7_9 was communicated unequivocally to several representatives of Appellant, the only potential lien claimant.
>flll
(Tr. p. 105, lines 7-9; and p. 155, lines 3-28)
b:
Jser.
In the instant case Appellant's off ice manager
mt'- claimed that picking up the building permit on I\Iay
-15 ~4, 1906, was "when the last bit of work was done for
; or the home."
(P. 148, lines 9-13 and 24-30) Also, it
~n1rr \\as implied that picking up the materials allegedly left
Ap at Hespornlenf s residence on or after May 24, 1966,
tte~
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was additional work extending the potential time fr T
filing a mechanic's lien. (Tr. p. 154, lines 7-20) Neitht (l
the picking up of the building permit nor the allege w:
picking up of surplus materials from Responden! b~
residence extended the statutory time for filing ar
mechanic's lien. District Heights Apartments v. Nt ar
land Co., 202 :J\!Id. 43, 95 A.2d 90, 39 A.L.R. 2d 3i to
(1953); Miller Lumber Co. v. Federal Home Develo~ 3l
ment, 231 Wis. 509, 286 N.W. 58, 122 A.L.R. n 8(1939). The Maryland Court of Appeals in the Du E
trict Heights Apartments case stated the principle till n
way:
w

[A lien claimant] cannot thereafter exten:
the time within which the lien may be filed b t'
11
doing or furnishing small additional items am
thereby fixing a date from which the period mru al
begin to run anew, especially where the doin! w
or furnishing of such items is merely colorablt e
and the real intention is to save or restore: w
right which is already imperiled or lost, or wher1 .
the additional work is done or additional ma SJ
te,rials are furnished without the knowledgt T
request or consent of the owner. District H eighl er
Apartments v. Noland Co., Ibid.
K
Under a Delaware statute a Delaware court ha1
held that the fact that a contract had not been fulh
performed at the time of its wrongful termination b!
the owner who had received the labor and material·
would not validate a lien-claim filed more than tht
90 days after the last labor was performed or the fas!
materials were furnished. Voigtman v. Wilmingtoi

8

ff
Iii
I:
p

oJ
n

Trust Bldg., Corp., 7 Penn. (Del.) 265, 78 Atl. 920
ht (1908) . The trial court in the instant case, however,
gt was not dealing with a wrongful termination of contract
n! by the owner but a rejection of a contract performfr

Vt

3!
o~

ij:

)u

;bi

ance which, as it held, was "unworkmanlike, unskillful
and careless" and which did in fact cause actual damage
to Respondent's residence. (R. 24; Tr. p. 18, lines 2430; p. 19, lines 1-11; p. '1-3, lines 14-30; p. 27, lines
8-16; p. 44, lines 1-8; p. 48, lines 23-28; and p. 55-58)
Even Appellant's chief witness, DA YID A. NABOR,
Yerified that Respondent's earliest complaint was "unworkmanlike" performance. (Tr. p. 156, lines 7-15)

Although there is some division among the authorib ties as to the exact time of abandonment, Respondent's
illl
w absolute rejection of the contract and Appellant's un;Il! workmanlike performance of said contract reasonably
bit establish the lime of abandonment as the date on which
~: work ceased, the "Stop vVork" order issued, and Reer1
13 spondent ordered Appellant's workmen off his premises.
gt That day was May 7, 1966, not May 24, 1966. Cf. Chihi cago Lumber Co. v. Merrirnack River Sav. Bank, 52
Kan. 410, 34 P. 1045 (1893).
~n'

131

The burden of demonstrating that a lien has been
lh filed within the statutory 80-day period rests on the
b! lien claimant, Nagle v. Club Fontainbleau, 17 Utah 2d
~
.
125, 405 P .2d 346 ( 1965), who must substantially comht ply with all requirements of the statute in the statement
11!
of his claim, and in all essential particulars such stateoi JUent must be true. Morrison, Merrill Co. v. Willard,

9

17 Utah 306, 53 P. 832 ( 1898). If the claimant fat
i·o file his lien within 80 days of the last substantial wor l!

done on the premises, his claim of a lien is invalii er
N ar;le ·~'. Club Jllrmtainbleau, Ibid.
rt

Appellant in the instant case failed to satisfy tfi w
Trial Court ti1ilt its lien was filed timely. Its own wii cc
nesses clearly estabfahed .May 6 or 7, i966, as the ver 01
last day any "substantial" work was done on the "pren st
ises" of the Respondent. Consequently, a lien filed o August 10, 1966, was either 95 or 96 days after an, T
substantial work \Vas done on Respondent's premise cc
Equally fatal to the validity of Appellant's claim 1 a~
lien was the falsity of the claim itself which allegB (
~h(1t Ap~jellant had furnished the "last labor and rn• tc
iL.rials on the 24th day of May, 1966." (R. 16) Tl1 tc
only thing accomplished by Appellant on said late dai
was the delinquent purchase of a building permit.
tl

There was, therefore, no error committed by tf1 ff
Trial Court in finding that the Appellant's Notice " f<
lien filed August 10, 1966, was invalid and did wroni w
fully misrepresent the date on which the last labor an Y
('
materials were furnished by Appellant.

POINT II

sl
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THE DA::\IAGES FOUND RY THE TRIAi 1i
COURT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT ANI
APPELLANT ARE SUBSTANTIATED B1
TI-IE E \TIDENCE AND ARE NOT EXCES a:
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Under Section 38-1-18, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, the successful party in any action brought to
enforce a mechanic's lien "shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court,
which shall be taxed as costs in this action." Appellant's
counterclaim (R. 5) was in fact an action to enforce
or foreclose a mechanic's lien. Respondent, being the
successful party in said action, was entitled therefore
--as a matter of law-to a reasonable attorneys' fee.
The original complaint of Respondent prayed for both
costs of the action and "such other and further relief
as to the court may seem proper in the premises."
(R. 2) This statutory allowance of attorneys' fees
to the successful party in such an action should extend
to an appeal as well as the trial stage of the action.
Counsel for Appellant submitted to the Trial Court
that the Utah State Bar Fee Schedule could be followed
in assessing attorney fees. His submission was in the
following language: "If there are attorney fees either
way, we'll submit that the bar schedule is subject to
Your Honor's inspection." (Tr. p. 158, lines 1-3)
Counsel for Respondent joined in that submission. It
should be noted that the $250.00 attorneys' fee awarded
to Respondent is less than allowed under the Utah State
Har Fee Schedule for an action to foreclose a $3,290.00
lien.

The general damages in the sum of $627.00 were
~S assessed as compensation to restore Respondent's residence to its condition prior to Appellant's breaking

11

the bricks all around Respondent's residence. Th.
damage was described at the trial by Respondeni
the Utah State Building Inspector and one of Appel
lant' s own workmen. (Tr. p. 8, lines 17-30; p. 9 an'.
10; p. 19, lines 1-8; p. 55-57; p. 69, lines 26-30; p. 711
lines 1-6; p. 127, lines 8-16; and Plaintiff's Exhi\1
L and JH) The Trial Court found that this damao
~
was caused by the "umvorkmanlike, unskillful an
careless manner" in which Appellant's workmen a1
tempted to apply siding to Respondent's residenct
( R. 24) To this finding the Appellant has taken 1:
exception.
Appellant did object to the admission of Plaintil!
Exhibits L and M as being heresay. (Tr. p. 67, lim
8-12) Respondent did, however, testify on cross exam
nation that he was present when one bid (Exhibit ~l
was handwritten and the other (Exhibit L) sig1m
Apparently the Trial Court followed the detailed est
mate of repair costs enumerated in Plaintiff's Exhili
M (Tr. p. 68, lines 20-30) as a partial guide to ti
amount of compensation for the substantial damag
to Respondent's residence. :MR . .T. F. FERRIN te1i
fied, with no objection from Appellant, that he hR
submitted a bid of $2,100.00 to re-cover the damagt
home of Respondent with wood grain siding inclwliL.
the placing of firring strips only 16 inches apart al'
heavier backers behind the siding. (Tr. p. 41, linr
2-30 and p. 42, lines 1-24)

It is submitted that the Trial Court had sufficiei
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cc
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l'h. competent evidence from the foregoing cited excerpts
eni from the Transcript to assess the damages at only
pe: $627.00. The Trial Court also made judicial note of
an. the fact that the bids had been submitted by "reputable
711
individuals in town." (Tr. p. 68, lines 2-3)

11il1

In answer to Appellant's objection to the award
iai of $1,000.00 as exemplary damages to Respondentan
Plaintiff, the following factors in this case should be
a1
recalled:

l 1:

till

Jim
am
~j

'lltl

I

est

hili

I

ti

1. Appellant induced Respondent to contract by

promises of an "A No. l" job to be shown on
television. (Tr. p. 4, lines 25-30; and p. 34, lines
11-15)
2. The contract was a form prepared by Appellant

and which by its printed terms unilaterally
favored and protected the Appellant. ( R. 18)
3. The work done by Appellant was unworkman-

like, unskillful and careless and caused great
damage to Respondent's residence. (R. 24)
4. Appellant avoided official detection of this in-

linr

cie1

ferior workmanship by willfully failing and
ref using to obtain a building permit with its
attendant inspection requirements by qualified
city inspectors. (Tr. p. 47, lines 13-19; p. 53,
lines 24-30; and p. 54, line 1)
5. In spite of Respondent's repeated objections to

the quality of Appellant's work (Tr. p. 6, lines
13-28 and p. 7, lines 15-19) Appellant's rep-

13

resentatives threatened to sue Respondent if lht A
(Appellant's workmen) couldn't finish the wor;
ap
(Tr. p. 35, lines 19-21)

W

6. Appellant filed a Notice of Lien against R1 de

spondent's residence on August 10, 1965, i P1
days after being ordered off the premises by tl (
Respondent on May 7, 1966, and 96 days aft1
their work had been officially stopped by tf
Ogden City Building Inspector on l\lay 6, 19ti1 w

7. The purported lien of Appellant falsely state
that the Appellant "did furnish the last labi
and materials on the 24th day of May, 1960
(R. 16)
8. The lien recording was published to commerci:
and professional establishments in the Ogdt
area by means of the "What's What" publicatio:
causing naturally great embarrassment to R1
spondent and his family. (Tr. p. 13, lines 18-2:
Exemplary damages may be allowed as a punisi
ment to a def en<lant as a warning and example to deh
him and others from committing like offenses in ti
future. 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages §237 (1965). Th
court has held that for a defendant to become liable f
exemplary damages he must know that his act is wrolli
ful and do it intentionally without just cause or excus
and if he acts in good faith, with honest belief that 11
act is lawful, he is not liable for such damages, thou;
mistaken as to legality of the act. Calhoun v. Univen
Credit Co., 106 Utah 166, 14<6 P.2d 284, 288 ( 1941
1
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Aud further, that the assessment of such damages must
,r; appear to have some basis in reason in relation to the
wrongful act, the manner and intent with which it was
R1 done, the injury inflicted and th actual damage suffered.
Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 152, 379 P.2d 380, 383
it

tl (1963).
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Appellant argues that there was no allegation of
willful misconduct or malice on the part of defendant
and that there was nothing in the evidence to show
either. To the contrary, the complaint of RespondentPlaintiff specifically prayed for $5,000.00 as exemplary
damages and the foregoing eight factors supported by
references to the Record and Transcript are replete
with evidence of willful and wrongful misconduct committed intentionally without just cause or excuse. The
contract in the instant case was solicited by means of
a sales commission in the sum of $800.00, about which
Appellant's off ice manager had a most difficult time
telling the truth. (Tr. p. 146, lines 8-30 and p. H7, lines
1-20)

Although the contract itself provided in bold print
a guaranty against faulty work or faulty materials, it
proved in fact to be merely illusory and a thing about
which Appelant refused discussion with Respondent.
(Tr. p. 6, liens 12-19; p. 154, lines 24-30; p. 155; and p.
1:36. lines 1-15) It was Appellant's horirble workmanship that caused the severe damage to Respondent's residcnce, which was, incidentally, a finding of the Trial
Court to 'vhich the Appellant has taken no exception.
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CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the Trial Court committed
error in finding the purported lien of the defenda
to be invalid and that the damages, both general a:
exemplary, awarded to Respondent were reasonal
and supported by the evidence. As a matter of h
Respondent was entitled to a reasonable attorneys' f
as a direct consequence of Appellant's countercla,
to foreclose a mechanic's lien. The judgment of !1
Trial Court should be sustained and Respondent awar
ed its costs.

Respect£ ully submitted,
FROERER, HOROWITZ, PARKER,
RICHARDS, THORNLEY & CRITCHLO\
BY: 'VILLIAM J. CRITCHLOW, III
200 Kiesel Building

Ogden, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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